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Front cover 
The media is being 
transformed in most 
fragile states. Here, 
a rebel soldier, 
armed with a 
Kalashnikov rifle, 
listens to a radio 
near the village of 
Ouandago in the 
Central African 
Republic ahead of 
peace talks in 2009. 
Sven TORfinn/ 
PAnOS PiCTuReS
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Fragile states are an increasing priority for international 
diplomatic and development attention. The media – 
defined here as both traditional and digital media – is being 
transformed in most fragile states. Such transformations 
are unleashing unprecedented democratic energy, with 
profound political and social consequences. 
Fragile states are often fractured states, divided along 
religious, political, ethnic or other factional fault lines. 
For all the fresh potential they offer citizens to hold 
government to account, new media landscapes are also 
increasingly fractured – and are often fragmenting along 
the same fault lines that divide society. Co-option of 
the media by narrow factional interests appears to be 
growing. 
Successful political settlements in fractured fragile states 
depend on societies developing a stronger sense of 
shared identity. In the past, critics of support to media 
in fragile states have argued that a free and diverse media 
can foster division, reinforce factional identities and 
undermine state stability. The prospects of more open, 
free and vibrant media environments have prompted 
wariness in the past among those working to support 
state stability where government and governance is 
sometimes weak.  
This briefing examines how current media trends are 
affecting state and societal fragility, both positively and 
negatively. It argues that development actors should 
embrace the reality and opportunities provided by 
changed media and communication environments 
and that the role of a free and plural media should be 
prioritised rather than – as seems the case at present – 
marginalised in much fragile states policy.   
It argues that shared identity and sustainable political 
settlements will be best enabled by national and local 
dialogue. Such dialogue is dependent on a free media 
that is independent of undue factional or governmental 
control. Efforts to shut down the media, even if feasible, 
risk doing more harm than good in fragile states 
as elsewhere. Support to the media in fragile 
states designed to minimise the risk of division 
and maximise the opportunities for dialogue 
should feature more prominently in assistance 
to such states.
The briefing is designed principally for policy-
makers working to support development in 
fragile states. It draws on and summarises some of the 
conclusions drawn from earlier policy briefings published 
by BBC Media Action on the role of the media and 
communication in four fragile states – Afghanistan, Iraq, 
Kenya and Somalia. The central section (pages 14–28) 
provides a summary of each of these briefings. The 
rest of the document seeks to draw some insights and 
conclusions from this and other BBC Media Action 
research and experience relevant to fragile states. 
 “Efforts to shut down the media, 
even if feasible, risk 
doing more harm 
than good. ”
 Executive summary
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S Left Fragile states are 
often fractured states, 
divided along religious, 
political, ethnic or 
other factional fault 
lines. In this image 
from Kathmandu, 
protestors support a 
strike called by the 
unified Communist 
Party of Nepal 
(uCPN) to remove 
the ruling government.
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INTRODuCTION
Why media matters in fragile states
Definitions of “fragile states” vary but they are, as the 
term implies, states where it takes little for them to 
fall apart. These are countries where government and 
governance is weak, where the rule of law does not 
run across the country and where there is tension and 
conflict in society. According to The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 
“A fragile region or state has weak capacity to carry 
out basic governance functions, and lacks the ability 
to develop mutually constructive relations with 
society. Fragile states are also more vulnerable to 
internal or external shocks such as economic crises or 
natural disasters.”1
This briefing focuses on fragile states that are also “fractured 
states”. These are states where the existence of different 
politics, religions or ethnicities makes relationships 
between communities difficult, and where the building 
of shared identity can be especially challenging. 
There is a great deal more media now in fragile states 
than there was a decade ago (for the purposes of 
this briefing, “media” encompasses all means 
of information and communication available to 
people,  including mobi le 
and internet technologies). Over 
the past decade broadcast and 
print media outlets have generally 
increased in fragile states, mobile 
telephony has become increasingly 
ubiquitous and social media 
more widespread. This briefing 
highlights the positive, sometimes 
democratically transformative, 
effect that new media and 
communication environments and 
renewed freedom of expression 
can have in fragile states. It also 
highlights some of the challenges posed when, as 
is also increasingly the case in some countries, 
media fractures along religious, sectarian or other 
factional lines. 
Fragile states matter. With less than two years to go, 
no low-income fragile state has yet achieved any of 
the Millennium Development Goals. The percentage 
of people classed as extremely poor who live in fragile 
states has doubled from 20% to 40% and is expected 
to exceed 50% by 2015.2 Fragile states tend to be 
conflict-affected states and about 70% of them have 
been in conflict since 1989.3 Such states are considered 
drivers of international insecurity and their perception 
as a breeding ground for international radicalisation and 
terrorism has been a central factor in making them a 
greater development priority.
The uK Department for International Development 
(DFID) has made support to fragile states a major 
priority for some years,4 arguing that “we will not 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals or eliminate 
global poverty if the international community does not 
address conflict and fragility more effectively”.5 So 
too has the united States of America6 and many other 
bilateral donors. The European union now spends 
half of its development budget in fragile states7 and 
around 30% of all global development aid is devoted 
to them.8 In 2011, the international development 
community, convened by OECD, agreed a landmark 
New Deal on Fragile States to prioritise support to 
these countries, together with a set of principles to 
underpin that support.9
The main conclusion of this briefing is that media and 
communication increasingly matter in fragile states. 
They matter in different ways in different countries, 
but the growth and fragmentation of the media – and 
the resulting increase in access to information and 
communication – are having increased impact on many 
levels. Media and communication sectors sometimes 
create the conditions for, and sometimes undermine the 
chances of, sustainable political settlements. They are 
having profound social impact, sometimes intensifying 
the politics of identity and at other times transcending 
such politics. They are in part shaping, but are more 
often shaped by, the fragile economics of these states. 
This briefing argues that these effects are not well-
researched and the role of the media rarely features 
substantively in policy considerations focused on support 
to fragile states. 
Part 1 examines what makes states fragile and argues 
that conventional definitions of fragility rarely reflect the 
fractured character of many fragile states. 
Part 2 looks at some of the main media and communication 
factors affecting the prospects for sustainable political 
settlements in fragile states. 
Part 3 examines some of the main academic and policy 
debates that have characterised discussion around media 
and fragile states.
Part 4 provides some overarching insights derived from 
the country case studies that form the spine of this briefing. 
Part 5 asks how, and under what conditions, the 
media might reduce or increase state fragility. It focuses 
especially on whether new media environments are 
 “We will not achieve the Millennium Development 
Goals or eliminate global 
poverty if the international 
community does not 
address conflict and fragility 
more effectively.”DFID
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enabling shared identities to emerge in fragile states. 
It also considers the role of public service broadcasting 
in fragile states.
Part 6 examines how the role of the media is currently 
prioritised within international development strategies, 
and especially within policy discussions around fragile 
states. It suggests that much needs to change if such 
issues are to be properly addressed in the future.
Part 7 concludes and offers recommendations.
The central section of the briefing provides case 
studies on the role and impact of the media in four fragile 
states – Afghanistan, Iraq, Kenya and Somalia – asking 
whether the media has, or is likely to, drive greater 
political polarisation and fracturing or have more positive 
effects. These are summarised accounts of earlier policy 
briefings published by BBC Media Action. 
Which states are fragile? 
The OECD lists the following states as fragile.
Low-income fragile states Middle-income fragile states
27  Angola
28  Bosnia and Herzegovina
29  Republic of the Congo
30  Côte d’Ivoire
31  Georgia
32  Iraq
33  Islamic Republic of Iran
34  Kiribati
35  Kosovo
36  Marshall Islands
37  Federal States of Micronesia
38  Nigeria
39  Pakistan
40  Solomon Islands
41  South Sudan
42  Sri Lanka
43  Sudan
44  Timor-Leste
45  West Bank and Gaza
46  Republic of Yemen10
1  Afghanistan
2  Bangladesh
3  Burma/Myanmar
4  Burundi
5  Central African Republic
6  Chad
7  Comoros
8  Democratic Republic 
 of Congo
9  Eritrea
10  Ethiopia
11  Guinea
12  Guinea-Bissau
13  Haiti
14  Kenya
15  Democratic People’s 
 Republic of Korea
16  Kyrgyz Republic
17  Liberia
18  Malawi
19  Nepal
20  Niger
21  Rwanda
22  Sierra Leone
23  Somalia
24  Togo
25  Uganda
26  Zimbabwe
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1112
13
14
1516
17
18
19
20
21
22
2324
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32 33
34
35
3637
38
39
40
41
43
42
44
45
46
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PART 1
What makes states fragile?
The establishment of security, the rule of law and the 
institutions that enable the state to function and provide 
services to its citizens should be a core focus of policy 
support to fragile states. However, as Professor Paul 
Collier argued in his book, Wars, Guns and votes: 
Democracy in Dangerous Places, “The fundamental 
mistake of our approach to state-building has been to 
forget that well-functioning states are 
built not just on shared interests but 
on shared identity.”11 
Most fragile states are fractured 
states – states where often deep fault 
lines divide communities along ethnic, 
religious, political or other factional 
lines. Whether because of scarce 
resources, corruption, inequality or 
artificial colonial boundaries that ignore 
socio-political, geographic or economic 
conditions, these societies are both 
politically fragmented and often dislocated from – and 
ambivalent towards – the state. Conflict, or the threat 
of conflict, is high.12 
This briefing focuses mostly on fractured fragile states 
where the politics of identity is played out, and often 
fuelled by, where and how people get their information, 
what shapes their opinion and loyalty and how they find 
views like their own reflected in the public domain. 
Identity politics in such states can take myriad forms. 
In Somalia, an ethnically homogeneous country, the 
country’s fracturing is in part driven by the complex clan 
system, in part by extremist religion and in part by more 
traditional political factionalism. Kenya is an ethnically 
fractured country, whose fragility was most dramatically 
illustrated around the violent 2007–08 elections. In 
Afghanistan, ethnic fault lines are compounded by 
religious and associated political divides, as well as by 
resistance to international intervention. In Iraq, ethnicity 
and sectarianism have come to define the power struggle 
hindering the rebuilding of a stable and functioning state. 
The politics of identity in these states may be intensified 
by their demographics. Fragile states have among 
the youngest populations and highest fertility rates 
in the world.13 The countries covered by this briefing 
– Afghanistan, Kenya, Iraq and Somalia – all feature in 
the 20 states with the highest fertility rates. So too do 
the Democratic Republic of Congo, Nigeria, Yemen and 
several other fractured fragile states. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
over 70% of the population is aged below 30.14 More than 
half of Afghanistan’s population is under the age of 18.15 
The next section will argue that as the mediafragments 
in fractured states, many current media and 
communication trends are reinforcing and intensifying 
separate identities rather than encouraging the 
development of shared identity. However, this briefing 
highlights the fact that these trends have positive as well 
as worrying implications. It also argues that encouraging 
shared identity is something that will need to be driven 
by people, not just by elites, and that the role of the 
media will be critical to that process.
Right A view of a 
destroyed building in 
Mogadishu, Somalia.  
Rebuilding the country 
will depend on people, 
and not just elites, 
overcoming their 
differences.  Sv
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 “The fundamental mistake of our approach to 
state-building has been to 
forget that well-functioning 
states are built not just on 
shared interests but 
on shared identity.”PAuL COLLIER
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PART 2
Is the media increasing or 
reducing fragility?
Media and communication systems in most fragile states 
are expanding rapidly. This story of growth applies to 
states that have suddenly liberalised (such as Iraq and 
Afghanistan), those typified by state failure or ongoing 
conflict (such as Somalia, Democratic Republic of Congo 
and Nepal), and those balanced between stability and 
fragility (such as Kenya, Nigeria and uganda). 
From the ebullient 24-hour news channels of Pakistan to 
the one-party broadcast sterility of Eritrea, and from the 
bustling commercial media and technology dynamism 
of Kenya to the post-conflict uN radio stations of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan and the 
booming telecommunication penetration of Bangladesh, 
media and communication environments in fragile 
states are as varied as the states themselves. Drawing 
common trends across such states can be dangerous but 
four trends can be said to apply to the media in most 
fragile states.
The first notable media trend in fragile states is the 
explosion in people’s access to information and their 
capacity to communicate and express themselves. 
Access to traditional broadcast media has been 
booming for years, typified by the accelerating access 
to satellite Tv and other forms of independent media 
since the 1990s.16 Mobile phone use has mushroomed 
in nearly all fragile states, growing almost six-fold in 
five years – from 7% of the population in 2005 to 
40% in 2010, according to the OECD.17 In some 
countries such as Burma and Somalia, mobile phone 
access remains relatively low but the expectation is 
that access will grow substantially in most fragile states. 
By 2025, “there could be near-universal mobile phone 
coverage”, according to a report from the Overseas 
Development Institute.18 And while access to the 
internet is still limited in many parts of the developing 
world, it is only likely to increase as the cost of technical 
equipment declines.19 Development policy has never 
before confronted the situation of an almost universally 
connected world. 
Hand in hand with increased access has been the 
appropriation of the media by ordinary citizens, 
particularly through social media. These new 
technologies have had transformative effects because 
citizens have occupied the online space and made it 
their own. The means of communication – traditionally 
in the hands of the state or a relatively small number 
of commercial and other actors – is being diffused and 
democratised, often over less than a decade. In most 
fragile states, which often have a very limited history 
of citizens being able to organise themselves politically, 
this capacity to communicate has influenced a dramatic 
and rapid shift in the capacity of citizens with common 
interests or identities to forge new networks and 
organise collectively. 
A third media trend in fragile states is the fragmentation 
of media environments. Access to media and 
communication has increased not just because of 
technological innovation, but because the sheer number 
of media organisations in most fragile 
states has mushroomed. After 1989, the 
near-monopoly that governments held 
over the media broke down in all but 
a few of the most repressive regimes. 
Driven by journalistic energy, popular 
demand for new forms of information and 
entertainment, as well as the liberalisation 
of rules governing commercial investment, 
privately owned – and in some cases community media 
– flourished in many parts of the developing world. 
Some states, such as Ethiopia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and, 
until recently, Burma have resisted this trend, keeping 
a tight rein on the number of media outlets allowed 
to broadcast. But in states as diverse as Afghanistan, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia and Kenya, the number of 
media organisations has boomed since the turn of the 
millennium. In Afghanistan, for example, Tv and radio 
expanded by about 20% a year from 2006 onwards 
and by September 2010 there were over 75 terrestrial 
Tv stations and 175 FM stations, with the broadcast 
spectrum now nearly saturated.20 
This fragmentation of media is increasingly characterised 
by the fracturing of media markets. Local, minority 
and vernacular language media has become far more 
common, and fractured states are often characterised 
by fractured media. Both commercial and political 
drivers have fuelled the growth of media catering for 
specific communities – linguistic, ethnic, religious and 
political. Commercial forces have opened new markets 
in these communities, especially when advertising 
markets in the majority or mainstream languages 
or communities have become saturated. Alongside 
this, technological innovation has lowered the cost of 
entry into media markets, including broadcast markets, 
 “Mobile phone use has mushroomed in 
nearly all fragile states, 
growing almost six-fold 
in five years.”
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making it easier to start media operations focused on 
niche populations. 
Where politics is fractured, as it is in most fragile states, 
political actors have strong incentives to support – and 
sometimes create – media outlets that enable them 
to reach the constituencies that comprise their 
support base. Particularly in fragile states, the newly 
independent media that emerged in the 1990s and 
2000s has increasingly become a target for factional 
actors. In these states, where power is so often 
exercised through patronage and loyalty, the usefulness 
of being able to shape public opinion 
and attract attention by influencing – 
and if necessary controlling – the media 
has been increasingly realised. Media 
outlets have become more vulnerable to 
political parties and religious, ethnic or 
other factional actors exerting influence 
over or buying up the media, or starting up their own 
media houses. In short, fractured media markets are 
also increasingly co-opted media environments. 
Research for a BBC Media Action policy briefing on the 
Afghan media, published in 2012, found that much of the 
dynamism and relative independence of the media in the 
country was the product of private investment as well as 
donor funding. However, it also found that “Afghanistan’s 
open licensing regime has also permitted politicians and 
religious leaders to set up their own media and many 
have done so over the past five or six years. They are 
sometimes referred to as ‘warlord’ channels because 
they have more restricted agendas than mainstream 
commercial media. In some cases, they have provoked 
divisive conflicts and prompted concerns that they are 
exacerbating an already worrying trend towards the 
ethnicisation of Afghan politics.”21
The case studies that form the central section (pages 
14–19) of this briefing provide some insight into the 
political effects of the fragmentation and fracturing of 
media and communication environments. More intensive 
research on the implications of such fragmentation has 
taken place in the industrialised world, especially in the 
uSA. Much commentary from industrialised countries 
 “Fractured media markets are also 
increasingly co-opted 
media environments.”
Above Street art 
from Cairo depicting a 
videographer coming 
face to face with a 
soldier. Dramatic 
changes in access
to media and 
communication helped 
spark the Arab Spring. 
Their lasting impact 
remains to be seen.
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in recent years has focused on concerns that more 
fragmented media systems are increasing political 
polarisation and driving greater extremism in society.22 
It argues that as people become increasingly exposed only 
to information and opinion with which they already agree, 
the resulting “echo chamber” effect drives a process of 
group polarisation.23 
Research on such effects in industrialised countries is 
not always conclusive and very little similar research 
has taken place in fragile states.24 It is difficult to find 
clear research to support a conclusion that fragmentation 
is driving polarisation in fragile states. But given their 
fragmentation, 21st-century media and communication 
environments appear unlikely to provide the conditions 
best suited to nurturing the development of shared 
identity in fragile states.
Finally, the fourth emerging trend relates to the changing 
media consumption habits of young people within fragile 
states. Young populations are highly adept at using new 
communication technologies to form their own identities 
and communities. They may also be targeted by factional 
interests intent on manipulating the media and social 
media to recruit them to their cause. 
Several of these trends were dramatically encapsulated 
in the 2011 Arab Spring. The decentralisation of 
communication was readily on display in the form of 
increased access to social and digital media, as was 
the increased availability of trusted media in the form 
of channels such as the BBC and Al Jazeera available 
via satellite across the Arab world.25 The enhanced 
communicative capacity of individuals to organise 
themselves and find a common purpose via peer-to-peer 
social networks greatly increased their power to effect 
change. Such shifts in communicative power, alongside 
the frustrated aspirations of young, increasingly educated 
populations, were universal drivers of the Arab Spring 
revolutions.26 
None of the Arab Spring countries (save Yemen) was put 
onto the OECD 2012 list of fragile states, although many 
would argue that several of them now fulfil many of the 
characteristics of fractured fragile 
states. The role of both social and 
traditional media in the revolutions 
themselves is well documented. 
Less well documented are their 
effects now (which is likely to 
form the subject of another BBC 
Media Action policy briefing in 
the future). It is still too early 
to assess whether the dramatic 
impact of shifts in media and 
communication environments in 
Arab Spring countries may have 
similar effects in other currently less well connected, 
and often poorer, fragile states. However, the Arab 
Spring clearly demonstrated the potential power of 
such changes to communication access.
In sum, the capacity of citizens to exercise freedom 
and agency, and to take control of their own political, 
social and economic destiny has grown immensely 
over the past decade as media output has exploded 
and communication technologies have spread. At the 
same time, the capacity of factional interests to co-opt 
and manipulate the media and communication has also 
grown in many fragile states. 
Some of these trends are new and some are long-standing. 
The next section looks at earlier debates about the role 
of the media and communication in fragile states.
 “21st-century media and communication 
environments seem less 
likely to provide the 
conditions best suited to 
nurturing the development 
of shared identity in fragile 
states.”
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PART 3
Support to media in fragile states: 
the case for and against
There has been a long-standing assumption within the 
international donor community that a free and plural 
media can, and should, be a force for democratic change 
in fragile states – as in other countries.
It is difficult to find clear estimates for the amount of 
money dedicated to support for the media in fragile states 
as it has always formed part of more generalised support 
for democracy and governance in the developing world. 
A 2007 survey by the prestigious National Endowment 
for Democracy Center for International Media Assistance 
estimated that uS$142 million per year was being spent 
“to develop independent media”.27 
Although such spending is small in the context of 
overall development spending, development actors 
have regarded the media as a check on overweening 
state power. This is significant in settings where other 
mechanisms for holding government to account – such as 
elections and taxation – are notoriously weak and where 
patronage can easily undermine formal accountability 
institutions such as the judiciary and parliament.28 
Thomas Carothers of the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace summed this view up nicely: 
“Opening up a closed media will allow greater public 
scrutiny of poorly performing areas of state function.”29 
The role of the media as an accountability mechanism 
can sometimes coincide with its role in mitigating 
conflict. The World Bank’s 2011 World Development 
Report on Conflict, Security and Development argued 
that “an inclusive public dialogue requires capacity and 
resources, not just of state institutions or of civil society, 
but also of the media, which can play an important role 
in ensuring public accountability and act as a citizen 
voice.”30 
But while donor attitudes towards media support in 
developing countries in general tend to be positive, many 
have expressed caution about encouraging a free and 
plural media in fragile states.
The priority for most actors working to support fragile 
states is to make the countries stable and to help 
governments provide services, the rule of law and 
Right The divisive 
nature of the media 
has been a feature of 
elections in several 
countries in recent 
years, including Kenya. 
In this picture taken in 
January 2012, 
newspapers in Nairobi 
announce the decision 
of the International 
Criminal Court to 
charge four prominent 
Kenyans, including the 
current president 
uhuru Kenyatta, with 
crimes against 
humanity. TO
N
Y 
K
A
Ru
M
BA
/A
FP
/G
ET
T
Y 
IM
A
G
ES
 BBC MEDIA ACTION POLICY BRIEFING #10 OCTOBER 2013 SIGN UP FOR OUR NEWSLETTER: WWW.BBCMEDIAACTION.ORG 11
security for their citizens. A dominant theme of research 
and debate over recent years is whether external support 
for democratic reform – including media liberalisation 
– decreases or increases the prospects for sustainable 
political settlements that can deliver these outcomes. 
This and other debates31 over “democratic sequencing”32 
have set the context for difficult – occasionally bitter – 
arguments over the wisdom of encouraging more free 
and open media in unstable and fragile states. 
There is substantial unease about external support 
for media reform among some, much of it focused 
on concerns that more open, liberalised and complex 
media systems can encourage division and reinforce the 
politics of identity in fragile states. These concerns gained 
particular currency following the Rwandan genocide in 
1991, when Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines 
provided the most notorious example of hate media 
being used to advance atrocity.33 The International 
Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda found three journalists guilty 
of genocide and incitement to genocide. The role of 
media in the Yugoslav Wars in the 1990s,34 especially the 
state media controlled by Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia 
as well as in Croatia, has been well documented. More 
recently, the divisive nature of the media has been a 
feature of elections in several countries, including Côte 
d’Ivoire35 and Kenya.
Such examples remain comparatively rare, however, and 
the causes of hate media are deeply contested. The use 
of media in Serbia and Rwanda as a weapon of hate 
was through the cynical deployment of state power 
co-opting media in its own interests. Media freedom 
and rights activists point to a panoply of examples where 
extraordinary journalistic courage – generally for very 
little reward – has succeeded in exposing corruption 
and rights abuses in fragile states and acted as a check 
on often brutal governments or other forces of power. 
Nevertheless, examples such as Rwanda and Serbia 
have prompted scholars to question support for media 
in fragile states. 
Snyder and Ballentine (1996) concluded that the 
promotion of unconditional freedom of public debate 
in newly democratising societies can often exacerbate 
tensions in society. “From the French Revolution to 
Rwanda, sudden liberalisations of press freedom have 
been associated with bloody outbursts of popular 
nationalism. The most dangerous situation is precisely 
when the government’s press monopoly begins to break 
down.”36 They went on to urge non-governmental 
organisations and other aid donors to reconsider 
projects that provide ethnic minorities with their own 
media outlets. 
An influential report prepared by the London School 
of Economics Crisis States Centre (Putzel and van der 
Zwan, 2005) similarly argued that: “In situations where 
the state is fragile… and where the political process 
is unstable and de-legitimated… unsophisticated 
liberalisation of the media can potentially undermine the 
state-building project.” In such situations, they argued, 
“it may also be misguided and potentially dangerous to 
assume that encouraging the creation 
of free and independent media will 
automatically strengthen civil society, 
or help establish a democratic 
system that will hold governments 
accountable.”37
More recent concerns have focused 
less on the capture of the media by one 
dominant actor or set of actors but on 
a more complex interaction between 
a fragmented liberalised media and 
fractured political systems, particularly 
around elections. Nicole Stremlau, 
writing in 2012 on the challenges 
facing Somaliland in determining its 
approach to media liberalisation, 
wrote: “Independent or ‘free’ media 
are intended to perform a role similar to that of elections 
in facilitating political conflict in a controlled, non-violent 
way, providing a platform for citizens to express their 
support or discontent with leadership and offering space 
to debate, which helps to legitimise outcomes, whether 
democratically determined or not.” 
Stremlau argued that the role of the media in countries 
emerging from violence is vulnerable to being used to 
fuel conflict, especially around the time of elections: 
“Weak institutions and fragile rule of law make orderly 
succession difficult to achieve. Across the continent 
[Africa], as elections have become more competitive, 
they have also become more violent, particularly in the 
post-election period. As media systems have opened to 
competition and the variety of platforms have spread, 
particularly with the use of new technologies, the media 
have had an increasingly central role in violence.”38
Stremlau’s concerns were prompted in part by the 
Kenyan elections of 2007–08, which saw some of Kenya’s 
minority language media implicated in fuelling appalling 
violence (see the central section on pages 14–19 for a 
summary of BBC Media Action’s analysis of this situation). 
This briefing reaches a conclusion at odds with much 
critical analysis of media support to fragile states, arguing 
that media pluralism and freedom of expression should 
provide a core foundation for the successful emergence 
of sustainable political settlements. Nevertheless, these 
critiques note that problems emerge in fragile states 
if the principal role of the media is to reinforce the 
separation of identities without also having the capacity, 
means or will to enable the kind of dialogue that can 
create shared identities.
 “There is substantial unease about external 
support to media reform 
among some, much of it 
focused on concerns that 
more open, liberalised and 
complex media systems 
can encourage division and 
reinforce the politics of 
identity in fragile 
states.”
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PART 4
The media in fragile states: four case studies
This section provides summaries from earlier BBC 
Media Action policy briefi ngs focused on Kenya, Somalia, 
Afghanistan and Iraq. These briefi ngs explored the role 
of the media in these countries, and especially whether 
that role increased or reduced fragility. 
These four case studies are not necessarily typical of all 
fragile states. untypically, three of them have suffered 
invasions by international forces with very mixed effects. 
Through these case studies, this briefi ng aims 
to reach beyond the role of media in actively 
fostering hate and violence to explore its 
role in underpinning or undermining the 
fragility of fragile states. 
The fi rst conclusion that can be drawn 
from this analysis is that diverse factors can 
shape the role of media in fragile states. 
How vulnerable the media is to political 
co-option depends on history, culture and 
economics as well as politics and myriad other factors, 
often including extraordinary journalistic courage. The 
effects of media on state fragility are complex, and 
context-specifi c analysis is required if effective support 
strategies are to be possible.
Before 2008 in Kenya, for example, economics helped 
to drive a process of media fragmentation which, in 
conjunction with the charged and divided politics of the 
country, created the conditions for parts of the media 
to act as a force for division in society. Economics in 
Somalia, in conjunction with the demands of ordinary 
Somalis, are helping to drive a more moderate media in 
the face of extreme political pressure. In Kenya, a market 
existed for people to hear anger over the airwaves. In 
Somalia, at least to some extent, the opposite is true, 
making the business of fostering division through the 
media a diffi cult one. In Afghanistan in 2013, the lack 
of an economic model to sustain a free, independent 
and moderate media is a cause of immense concern. 
The media in Afghanistan is heavily subsidised, but who 
provides that subsidy and with what intent seems likely 
to play a large role in shaping its future. Here, as in all 
four case studies, politics remains a dominant factor – 
nowhere more so than in Iraq, where a historical legacy 
of political control and co-option of the media continues 
to shape its prospects. 
The second conclusion arising from these case studies 
is that the media can foster division and confl ict, but can 
also ameliorate it. In all four countries, parts of the media 
have arguably strengthened ethnic and sectarian identity, 
especially at key moments such as elections. The media 
in these countries has also been manipulated by warlords 
or other actors to advance political agendas allied to 
ethnic or sectarian interests. This has often spilled over 
into encouraging violence. However, the same media 
 “How vulnerable the media is to 
political co-option 
depends on history, 
culture and economics 
as well as politics.”
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Right Drivers of fragility 
vary across different 
states. The role of the 
media – positive and 
negative – is similarly 
varied but some 
common conclusions 
can be reached from 
earlier analysis from 
BBC Media Action.
 BBC MEDIA ACTION POLICY BRIEFING #10 OCTOBER 2013 SIGN uP FOR OuR NEWSLETTER: WWW.BBCMEDIAACTION.ORG 13
has at different times played a positive role. Some of 
the vernacular media in Kenya so implicated in fuelling 
the 2007–08 violence was also instrumental in calling for 
calm when the violence escalated. The “ethno-sectarian” 
media empires that have emerged in the last decade in 
Iraq and which were accused of fostering tension are now 
arguably playing a role in affi rming and giving legitimate 
voice to long-suppressed identities. The media of Somalia 
that glorifi ed war and warlords in the 1990s is arguably 
now a force for moderation, at least in parts of that 
divided country. 
The case studies suggest that a simple narrative painting 
an increasingly liberalised and decentralised media and 
communication environment in the role of villain or hero 
in fostering peace and inclusion can be misleading. Just 
because some media organisations are established to 
serve and refl ect the perspectives of specifi c groups in 
society does not mean their role is to infl ame tension 
and suspicion of others outside those groups. Another 
BBC Media Action policy briefi ng, The media of Pakistan: 
Fostering inclusion in a fragile democracy, published in 
2013, found that media outlets serving particular linguistic 
and ethnic communities had a positive infl uence. Their 
principal effect was to enhance local-level accountability: 
“In striving to present the demands of their province 
or ethno-linguistic community to the federation and in 
their articulation of a specifi c constituency’s interest, 
regional-language outlets have increasingly become 
power representatives of local interests.” Research 
suggested such media was becoming more popular
as a result.39
Third, in all these countries, the role of the media has 
been poorly considered in strategies designed to support 
the governance or transition of these countries. The role 
of the media and communication does not appear to have 
featured substantively in research or scoping exercises 
designed to underpin development 
support for these countries, and 
strategic focus on its role within the 
development – and even diplomatic 
– communities appears low. The case 
studies appear to suggest that media 
and communication can have substantial positive and 
negative effects on the prospects of sustainable political 
settlements emerging. In short, they warrant greater 
attention from policy-makers.
And, fi nally, the trend towards the media refl ecting 
specifi c identities in society is not being counterbalanced 
by media that transcends those identities. There is no 
obvious emergence of a media sector that enables 
constructive, unifying debate and dialogue among groups 
of people who consider themselves different to one 
another. Neither market nor political forces seem likely 
to encourage such a media sector as politics, economics 
and technology foster more fragmented media and 
communication environments. The lack of platforms for 
such dialogue potentially presents a signifi cant challenge 
to efforts to build countries based on shared, as well as 
fragmented, identities (see the box on Afghanistan on 
page 23). The next section argues that this presents a 
major challenge to fragile states and those working to 
support them. 
 “The media can foster division and confl ict, but 
can also ameliorate it.”
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Bloody outbursts or force for 
moderation? Four case studies on the 
role of media in fragile states
This section summarises the fi ndings of policy briefi ngs on the role of media in 
four fragile states. These are highly abbreviated and should ideally be read in 
conjunction with the more detailed analysis in the briefi ngs themselves.
The media of Afghanistan and 
the challenges of transition40
In 2003 there was no media to speak of in Afghanistan. 
The creation today of what is one of the most dynamic, 
inventive and plural media sectors of any fragile state is 
arguably one of the most signifi cant achievements resulting 
from international intervention in the country. The 
Taliban, famous for stringing up music cassette tape from 
trees in Kabul, banned all media except its own. Today, 
conservative estimates put the number of journalists and 
others working in the Afghan media at more than 10,000. 
The role of the media in today’s Afghanistan is complex 
and subject to the same pressures of infl uence, 
intimidation and control as in many fragile states. By 
and large, however, the Afghan media is considered to 
be seeking to work in the public interest, provides at 
least some checks on executive power and has become 
more professional and more trusted by its audiences. 
Afghanistan has an extremely liberal licensing regime, 
which has allowed almost anyone with the will and the 
resources to establish a broadcast presence. This means 
that the broadcast spectrum in Kabul and some other 
Afghan urban centres is saturated.
Right Afghanistan has 
developed one of the 
most dynamic and 
plural media sectors of 
any fragile state. In this 
picture, a woman in 
Kabul makes her first 
mobile phone call. NA
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This is, however, a heavily subsidised media sector. It 
has largely been created through private investment by 
Afghans from the diaspora, but many millions of dollars 
have been spent by international donors, either with the 
aim of nourishing a fragile new journalistic sector and 
fostering media freedom or to inform Afghan citizens 
about issues of most concern to external donors. 
Afghanistan is now in transition. Donors and international 
actors are drawing down their support in many sectors, 
including the media. The industrial base of the country 
remains extremely weak and the advertising market in 
the country is small – by the best estimates around uS$20 
million per year. The advertising income available to the 
media appears far too little to sustain the sector that has 
evolved over the last decade. 
Two consequences follow from this situation.
The first is that the relatively independent media that 
has evolved in Afghanistan will consolidate and to some 
extent shrink, with the media that remains – at least 
beyond the state broadcaster Radio Television Afghanistan 
(RTA) – focusing on audiences that are most attractive 
to advertisers.
The second is that the Afghan media will increasingly be 
paid for, and to a significant extent co-opted by, those 
who can afford to subsidise it. For several years, the 
same licensing regime that has permitted an explosion in 
relatively independent media has also enabled warlords 
and other power brokers to establish their own radio 
and Tv presence, often with international funding and 
generally with the clear aim of advancing their political 
agenda and attracting popular support and loyalty. Some 
of this media presence is externally funded, with several 
experts arguing that Iran may be the largest funder of 
media in Afghanistan after the uS. 
Added to this potentially divisive mix is the Taliban’s 
sophisticated use of both online and traditional media. 
Journalists travelling in Taliban-controlled parts of 
the country report that the Taliban uses video clips 
of bombed convoys or slain commanders in a highly 
systematic and effective way to create support for its 
cause. These clips are distributed by mobile phone to 
supporters and local media to keep them informed 
of Taliban activities. “The speed at which these clips 
appear is extraordinary,” said one Afghan journalist who 
had been travelling widely in the north of the country, 
“all young people have at least one on their mobile 
phones.”41
Afghanistan is a deeply fractured country. The media is 
now becoming more fractured and the incentives for 
political, religious, ethnic and other factional actors to 
own, control or co-opt the media appear to be very 
strong. The opportunities for these actors to do so 
appear to be increasing as both international forces and 
funding withdraw. The ability of the independent media 
that does exist to maintain – let alone increase – its 
independence and provide a home for free and effective 
journalism appears to be diminishing. The influence of 
both the Taliban and warlords is expected to grow, with 
potentially devastating consequences for journalists – 
especially women journalists – in the country.
In the summary of Somalia below, this briefing argues 
that the media of Somalia is increasingly becoming 
a force for moderation. Afghanistan’s media may be 
heading in the opposite direction. As international 
support declines, the ability of the media to provide 
a check on power will diminish and its vulnerability to 
those who plan to advance specific political agendas and 
foster greater division – and potentially further violence 
– in the country is increasing. Overall, Afghanistan is 
a country where an increasingly fragmented media is 
in danger of being co-opted to make the state even 
more fragile. 
In these circumstances it is perhaps not surprising that the 
Afghan government shows every sign of retaining control 
of the state broadcaster RTA, despite passing a media law 
in 2009 proposing its independence. However, while RTA 
remains under government control, it is difficult to see 
how it can provide a platform for independent national 
public debate in the country (see box on page 23 for 
information on how BBC Media Action is working with 
RTA to provide independent public service broadcast 
programming).
The future of Afghanistan will be substantially determined 
by its political leaders and by the political settlement that 
may or may not emerge in coming months and years. 
ultimately, the country Afghanistan is to become – its 
identity, its aspirations, its character, its prosperity – will 
be shaped by its people. If that is to happen successfully, 
the country will need a media sector capable of enabling 
the kind of dialogue – national as well as local – through 
which they can resolve their differences peacefully and 
air their perspectives, ideas and concerns in ways that 
can lead to resolution rather than conflict. It is difficult 
to see, given current trends in the country, how that 
situation will come about.
Despite this, strategies designed to safeguard the future 
of the Afghan media do not appear to feature significantly 
in any of the processes designed to prepare the country 
for its post-transition future. It is difficult to discern where 
in the development or diplomatic system responsibility 
lies for understanding media challenges. If the media is 
to play the role it is capable of, and if it is to avoid being 
used to serve the interests of those most intent on further 
fracturing this already fragile state, the Afghan media 
needs a clearer support framework. It is not currently 
clear how such a framework might develop, or whose 
responsibility it is.
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The media of Somalia: a force 
for moderation?42
Somalia is slowly emerging from decades of state failure. 
At different times the Somali media has been deployed as 
a tool of political control by the government and warlords, 
and of extremism by Al-Shabaab, an organisation affi liated 
to Al Qaeda. At the time of publishing its 2011 policy 
briefi ng, The media of Somalia: a force for moderation? 
BBC Media Action concluded that the media was 
becoming increasingly successful at refl ecting a diversity 
of perspectives in Somali society.
In the 1980s, during Muhammad Siad Barre’s dictatorship, 
freedom of the media in general – and radio in particular 
– was only possible from outside the country. Barre 
exerted a monopoly on the media and used government-
controlled Radio Mogadishu and Radio Hargeisa to 
control the political agenda and advance his own interests 
in ways familiar to most dictatorships.
After Barre’s fall in 1991, broadcast media became part 
of the terrain of war as clan-based warlords sought to 
establish and control radio to advance their own interests 
and claim political loyalty. Next came a hopeful phase 
of private investment heralded by the opening of Radio 
HornAfrik in 1999, fi nanced – like Radio Shabelle and 
others that followed – as a business enterprise by 
members of the Somali diaspora. Then came the era of 
Al-Shabaab and, from 2008, the reign of terror imposed on 
journalists, resulting in a slow near-death of independent 
media in the country as the organisation either took 
over or closed down independent radio stations.
With Al-Shabaab weakened – though still active – and a 
new and democratically elected government starting to 
assert itself, there is now rekindled hope for the media in 
Somalia. The media in 2013 appears to be more a force 
for moderation than one fuelling division and confl ict.
The question is, why? Why did the media behave in the 
way it did at different stages of this recent history and, 
to the extent that something as diverse as the media of 
Somalia in 2013 can be characterised in any way, why is 
it a force for moderation now?
Part of the explanation is simple. Political actors intent 
on authoritarian domination of their country have always 
wanted as much control over the media as possible. Barre 
was no different from all those dictators whose fi rst act 
in a coup is to seize control of the state broadcaster. 
Part of it has deep social and cultural roots. The 
establishment of warlord radio following Barre’s fall was 
partly a product of the leaders of Somalia’s complex clan 
system either establishing or taking over radio stations 
to advance their own interests in a political vacuum. 
The dominant effect of newly formed radio stations on 
Somali society in the years immediately following Barre’s 
downfall are widely held to have been very damaging and, 
in the words of one journalist, “fomented social hatred”. 
However, constitutional expert Professor Mohamed 
Sheikh Osman Jawari argued that the glorifying of war 
has strong cultural and historical roots. “Back in Somali 
history, culturally speaking, you will find that every clan 
had a poet who would speak on the bravery of the clan. 
After Barre fell, stations started mushrooming and it 
seemed like they were trying to replace the poets of the 
clans. [These stations] need to know that the pen of the 
journalist and holding of the microphone is a [position 
of] trust, people have entrusted them to act fairly, justly 
and impartially about the news that they find.”
The demand for such trusted information arguably 
creates the greatest optimism for the future role of the 
media in Somalia. In surveys and research carried out 
by BBC Media Action in 2011, a key conclusion was that 
Somalia, largely as a consequence of war and division, 
was becoming one of the most media-literate countries 
in Africa. The research found that, just as people were 
tired of war, they were also sick of hearing just one 
side of an argument. Most radio stations, especially the 
largest and most successful ones, responded to audience 
demand and increasingly attempted to achieve balance 
in their coverage. 
“This is how radio evolved in Somalia,” argued Rashid 
Abdi of the International Crisis Group. “It was part of a 
clan agenda then it tried to become balanced.” violence, 
intimidation and forceful co-option of the media had 
previously been successful in closing down a plurality of 
voices in Somalia, but it has proved of limited usefulness 
for those bent on using the media to command loyalty. 
Below Somalia, largely 
as a consequence of 
war and division, is 
becoming one of the 
most media-literate 
countries in Africa. 
Here Somali journalist 
Abdukadir Hassan 
Abdirahman – armed 
with a camera and a 
pistol – films a scene in 
Baidoa, outside 
Mogadishu. 
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Trusted information was provided in part by international 
stations such as the BBC, which has a higher percentage 
of listeners in Somalia than any country outside the uK 
(another key international broadcaster being voice of 
America). It was also provided by a new generation of 
commercial radio stations established largely as business 
enterprises by the Somali diaspora. 
The capacity of radio to inspire trust, the tendency 
of Somali people to value only those media they can 
trust, and the fact that the most trusted media channels 
tend to be those that represent multiple perspectives 
in society, has made the media a source of moderation 
rather than extremism in Somalian society. In Somalia, 
a balance of perspectives seems more likely to generate 
audiences and therefore create a strong business model 
for commercial investors – extreme media content ended 
up being bad business. When Al-Shabaab was in power 
and either operated radio stations or intimidated them 
into covering its content, it struggled to attract signifi cant 
audiences – making control of the radio less effective 
and diffi cult to sustain.
Many factors create reasons for optimism about the 
future of the media in Somalia, including the improved 
security and political climate and the extraordinary 
courage, resilience and determination of journalists in 
the country to defend their profession in the face of 
immense odds. However, a key factor is that there is a 
major demand for a trustworthy media that transcends 
factionalism, and a clear history of media providers – 
commercial, national and international – capable of 
supplying such information. 
This is a simplifi ed analysis of a highly complex media 
and political environment, not least because these 
issues play out differently in Somalia, Somaliland and 
Puntland. However, even against a backdrop where the 
media has been co-opted to serve the narrow interests 
of governments, factions or religions, there is nothing 
inevitable about a diverse media landscape fuelling 
extremism or violence. Even in a society as broken as 
Somalia, the media can play an important role in fostering 
political participation and dialogue.
Media and elections in Kenya43
On 4 March 2013 Kenyans took to the polls in an 
election that proved – to their relief and joy – to be 
largely peaceful. This was in stark contrast to Kenya’s 
2007–08 elections, which proved the most violent in 
the country’s history. 
In March 2008 BBC Media Action published a policy 
briefi ng: The 2007 elections and their aftermath: the 
role of media and communication. Many factors have 
been held responsible for the 2008 violence, among 
them the famously free and vigorous Kenyan media 
– particularly the vernacular media. “The violence after 
the announcement of the polls was due to the polarity 
in the media, which were turned into political tools,” 
Samuel Poghisio, Kenya’s information minister said at 
the time. One of the six people arraigned before the 
International Criminal Court (along with the current 
Prime Minister uhuru Kenyatta and his 2013 election 
running mate William Ruto) is Joshua Arap Sang, a 
journalist with Kass FM, a Kalenjin language station. He 
is accused of inciting violence.
Some have bracketed the role of the media in the Kenya 
crisis (which claimed around 1,200 lives44 and displaced 
664,000 people45) with that in Rwanda, a genocide that 
claimed the lives of almost a million. Not only was the 
scale of the crisis entirely different, the factors that 
led to media’s role in the crisis are barely comparable. 
In Rwanda, Radio Télévision Libre des Milles Collines 
(RTLM) was made to serve a genocidal machine. Despite 
Sang’s arrest, the role of the media in Kenya was far less 
organised and the factors behind its behaviour more 
complex. 
until the middle of the last decade the only broadcast 
media available in Kenya were in Swahili and English. 
In the early part of the 2000s, Kenya experienced an 
economic boom, providing advertisers with a strong 
incentive to open up new markets beyond Nairobi and 
other urban centres. While Swahili and English are the 
national languages, most people prefer to communicate 
in their own vernacular and there is a signifi cant minority 
that does not speak Swahili. To attract new consumers, 
commercial actors applied pressure on government to 
further liberalise the airwaves so that radio stations could 
be established to serve – and sell to – particular ethnic 
Above More than 
664,000 people were 
displaced following 
post-election violence 
in Kenya in 2008, in 
which the media 
played a role, chiefly 
through broadcasting 
hate speech. The 
Kenyan government 
has since made hate 
speech a crime.
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and linguistic communities. In 2004, a new law further 
liberalised the media, paving the way for a wave of new 
local language radio stations targeting listeners from the 
country’s main ethnic communities. 
The rationale behind these newly opened stations was 
principally commercial. As a result, those hired to present 
the programmes – including moderating talk shows – 
were largely entertainers, local celebrities and others 
most likely to attract a large audience. However, for the 
fi rst time in Kenya’s history, a broadcast public space had 
opened where minority language communities, many 
of whom were the most politically and economically 
marginalised in the country, had the opportunity to voice 
their anger over the airwaves to their own communities 
in their own languages.
During the 2007–08 elections, and especially when the 
election results were questioned, anger turned into 
something more. “The ethnic hate our radio station was 
propagating about those from outside the community 
was unbelievable,” one journalist told a forum organised 
by the media support organisation Internews at the 
time. “The unfortunate thing is that we let these callers 
speak bile and laughed about it,” the journalist said. 
unsurprisingly, many of those tasked with moderating 
these debates were wholly unequipped to do so. 
Signifi cant evidence exists that these radio stations also 
attempted to calm the violence once it had fl ared up.
unlike the other case studies presented here, the process 
of media liberalisation in Kenya was substantially driven 
from within the country rather than as a result of external 
pressure to democratise the airwaves. However, much 
could have been done to prevent the media’s role in 
the 2007–08 violence, both from within the country 
and through external support to the media. The role of 
the media did not, however, feature signifi cant support 
strategies designed to facilitate a successful election.
The Kenyan government’s response to the violence has 
been substantial, including passing new legislation making 
hate speech a crime and ensuring that all mobile phone 
users must register before getting a Sim card (viral hate 
text messaging was also a feature in the 2008 violence).
The Kenyan media’s behaviour during the 2013 elections 
was characterised by a determination across the media 
sector to support peaceful elections. The chair of the 
Independent Electoral Boundaries Commission, Isack 
Hasan, lauded this when he announced the results, 
saying: “If there was ever a time we needed a partner 
to moderate the rising temperatures, this was it and 
the local media came through in a special way.”46 The 
concern expressed by some is that the determination 
by the media to ensure a peaceful election prevented 
the airing of legitimate concerns and grievances that any 
democracy needs in order to ensure a proper electoral 
contest. According to The Economist magazine, “Kenya’s 
normally feisty media have been supine after their owners 
agreed to avoid coverage that might incite ethnic passions. 
In place of analysis, Tv stations broadcast pre-recorded 
messages urging peace.”47 
Many in Kenya disagree with that analysis but this – one of 
the most innovative, creative and digitally entrepreneurial 
media and communication environments in the world – 
provides key lessons for the ever-changing role of a highly 
fragmented media in a fractured and fragile country. 
The media of Iraq: 10 years on48
The media of Iraq, like that of Afghanistan, has received 
many millions of dollars to help establish it as the bastion 
of democracy those who invaded the country hoped it 
would become. The investment in Afghanistan’s media 
can, at least until now, be considered a real but limited 
success story. The degree to which the media in Iraq is 
ameliorating or accentuating fragility is more complex still.
unlike in Afghanistan, Iraq had a functioning media system 
before 2003 but it was entirely and brutally controlled 
by Saddam Hussein and those around him. As in much of 
the Arab world, there was never a signifi cant tradition of 
free and independent media in Iraq. Since the country’s 
independence, the broadcast media’s purpose was to 
foster national identity and unity under the vice-like grip 
of the ruling party. 
Following the Allied invasion in 2003, the Coalition 
Provisional Authority (CPA) tried to recreate the media 
in its own image. In January 2003, a now declassifi ed 
uS Department of Defense White Paper detailed the 
establishment of a rapid response media team that was 
to operate as the “quick-start bridge” between Saddam 
Hussein’s state-controlled media network and a longer-
term “Iraqi free media” network. BBC Media Action’s 
briefi ng stated that:
“Having professional uS-trained Iraqi media 
teams immediately in place to portray a new Iraq 
(by Iraqis for Iraqis) with hopes for a prosperous, 
democratic future, will have a profound 
psychological and political impact on the Iraqi 
people. It will be as if… the North Korean people 
turned off their Tvs at night, and turned them 
on in the morning to fi nd the rich fare of South 
Korean Tv.”
In the years immediately following the invasion, privately 
owned media fl ourished and the number of media outlets 
in the country mushroomed. More than 150 non-state- 
owned newspapers and magazines, 80 radio stations and 
21 Tv stations reportedly opened for business between 
2003 and 2004 alone. As is the case elsewhere in the 
Arab world, satellite Tv channels have now become 
the dominant medium. Today Iraqis have access to an 
estimated 30–40 Iraqi-facing Tv channels, as well as a 
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huge array of pan-Arab channels offering entertainment, 
news and current affairs and religious content. Research 
commissioned by BBC Media Action in the nine southern 
provinces of Iraq found that access to satellite Tv is 
near-universal at 97%.
However, Iraq remains deeply fractured and the media 
has fractured with it. The degree to which the uS vision 
of a free and open media came to pass is disputed but few 
people, including those in the international community, 
argue that it is the democratic media that was initially 
conceived. The reasons why such a media did not 
materialise are complex. In part it was due to the CPA’s 
own co-option of the state media, which was used to 
advance the position of the international coalition rather 
than being put at the service of the Iraqi public. In part 
it was the difficulties in understanding the extent to 
which media systems were entrenched in the Iraqi state 
apparatus for so many years. And in part it was because 
the rapid liberalisation of the media unleashed powerful 
ethnic and sectarian forces with strong incentives to 
establish or use media to advance their interests.
The establishment of new non-state broadcasters 
corresponded with the increased struggle for power 
in Iraq. In his influential 2007 study, Ibrahim Al Marashi 
characterised Iraq’s non-state media as being formed 
of “ethno-sectarian media empires” that operate in the 
vanguard of partisan political interests. This problem 
persists today, as most media houses play to the 
narratives of Iraq’s divided communities rather than 
seek to provide objective content. Statistical surveys 
generally support the widely held view in Iraq that people 
tune into the Tv or radio service that reflects their own 
ethnicity and religious/tribal affiliation.
Some Iraqi experts interviewed for the briefing argued 
that deregulation did more harm than good in Iraq, with 
the media proving to have a divisive effect, and that 
Iraqis lacked the skills and experience necessary to know 
how to use their new-found media and communication 
freedom.
Divisiveness is one thing – incitement to violence is 
another. The conclusion of the policy briefing was that 
“despite lingering low professional standards and partisan 
agendas, Iraq’s media has nonetheless stopped short of 
inciting violence. In a country so marred by appalling acts 
of political violence, this should not be underestimated.” 
Marashi was conducting his research at the height of 
Iraq’s sectarian insurgency and found no evidence that 
Iraq’s non-state media was directly airing calls to violence. 
Today, he believes that the media has moved on, arguing 
that: “The nature of ethno-sectarianism in Iraq is quite 
different than it was a couple of years ago… where you 
were getting information from your side during pitched 
battle, so to speak… Today, these channels serve as an 
incubator of identity in Iraq. Each of these channels 
portrays what it means to belong to a particular ethno-
sectarian community and what it means to be an Iraqi 
after the fall of Saddam Hussein.”
The case of Iraq suggests that even when the media is 
partial, polarised and fractured, it can play a positive 
as well as a negative role. Long-suppressed identities 
find free and legitimate expression over the airwaves, 
something that at least in theory may be mitigating the 
need for violent clashes on the streets.
Left The case of Iraq 
suggests that even 
when the media is 
partial, polarised and 
fractured, it can play a 
positive as well as a 
negative role. In this 
picture, taken in 2004, 
freelance Iraqi 
photographer Wathiq 
Khuzaie shows off his 
photos to onlookers in 
Baghdad.
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PART 5
 Building shared identity in fragile states
Collier’s argument that state-building needs to encourage the 
development of shared identity as well as shared interests 
comes with an observation. “Shared identity”, he argued, 
“does not grow out of the soil: it is politically constructed.”49
The political construction of shared identity has historically 
depended on control of the media. To the extent that 
creating a sense of shared identity is critical to the 
long-term stability and success of fragile states (and this 
paper shares Collier’s view that it is), how that political 
construction takes place is critical. This cannot now be 
achieved through centralised control of the media, but 
instead through enhanced support to a free and plural 
media capable of generating the kind of dialogue that can 
generate shared identity. Shared identity may not grow out 
of the soil, but, given today’s media and communication 
environments, it does at least in part 
need to grow from society’s roots.
The role of the media in constructing 
shared identity can be highly contentious. 
In the past, political leaders have 
relied heavily on control of the media 
to establish shared identities in their 
countries. Building a national identity 
in the image of a national leader has 
been a core theme of state-building 
in the past. It has ranged from the 
aggressive nationalism deployed by Nasser and other 
post-independence Arab leaders in the 1960s to those 
political leaders intent on muffling regional, ethnic and 
religious identities to advance their own national vision 
– Suharto in Indonesia and Nyerere in Tanzania being 
prime historic examples. All of these have counted their 
control over national media as vital assets. 
Such strategies seem decreasingly relevant to the 
political construction of shared identity in 2013. State 
broadcasters under tight control of central government 
retain by and large the infrastructure that allows leaders 
to reach the whole of their countries, but in general their 
programming has over many years become increasingly 
stale, unpopular, less trusted and less influential than other 
media. State broadcasters increasingly have to compete 
for financial income with their more nimble private sector 
competitors and state subsidy of such media is often in 
decline.50 A few countries retain tight centralised control 
of the media but, in a time of digital diversity, increasingly 
ubiquitous access to mobile telephony and in many places 
an explosion of private and other media, the relevance of 
state media to building national identity seems tenuous. 
State-owned and state-controlled media today is only 
rarely available as a key tool to political leaders to 
construct their own vision of national identity. Rather, it 
seems necessary to build shared identity through dialogue 
and debate between groups who are confident that their 
own identity is secure and valued. As a recent World 
Bank CommGAP report put it: “National dialogue is 
not a consequence of state-building, but a prerequisite 
for its success.”51
This suggests two things. 
First, the evolution of media and communication 
environments that affirm and provide legitimate outlets 
for specific groupings in society can be as healthy 
Right The uN has 
sponsored radio 
stations in several 
fragile states, including 
Radio uNAMSIL 
(pictured) which was 
established by the 
united Nations Mission 
in Sierra Leone in 
2000. It was transferred 
to Sierra Leonean 
management in 2010.
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 “Shared identity may not grow out of the soil, 
but given today’s media 
and communication 
environments, it does at 
least in part need to grow 
from society’s roots.”
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for state-building as it can – when it tips over into 
fostering violence – be devastating. Strategies that 
simply seek to limit people’s freedom of expression, 
access to information or to establish media entities 
that cater for particular communities are as likely to 
foster discontent and violence as they are to prevent it. 
Controlling information in fragile states would require 
huge state resources with consequences that are less 
likely to lead to sustainable, inclusive political settlements. 
Those intent on supporting state-building would do 
better to encourage engagement in highly complex and 
decentralised media and communication environments 
and to support strategies that minimise media fostering 
of violence and maximise its potential to enhance 
community and national dialogue.
Second, a shared national identity seems most likely 
to emerge when there are trusted platforms through 
which all citizens of a fragile state can engage in a shared 
national dialogue. In countries with highly fragmented 
media environments, the opportunities for the media to 
foster such a dialogue are as limited as they are important. 
Many different media models might be harnessed to create 
the conditions for such dialogue.52 In several fragile states, 
the uN has sponsored radio stations, the most famous 
example being Radio Okapi in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, managed by Fondation Hirondelle. This is widely 
credited with helping to reduce the level of inter-communal 
enmity and the prospects for electoral violence in that 
country. Other uN-sponsored radio stations have been 
founded in Angola, Cambodia, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
East Timor, Haiti, Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
Sudan and Sudan-Darfur, though with mixed results. “From 
Cambodia to Liberia, these uN stations have helped end 
violent conflict and make political transition possible. 
They have provided citizens with 
trusted local news programmes and 
non-partisan discussion forums, often 
for the first time”, argued a report 
from the National Endowment for 
Democracy Center for International 
Media Assistance. 
Shared identity might also emerge 
organically from the peer-to-peer 
networking53 that is increasingly taking place via social 
media or through networks of citizen journalists. For 
example, the Tunisian blog Nawaat, founded in 2006, has 
formed a national network of alternative and citizen media.
Shared identity can also emerge through public service 
broadcasting. BBC Media Action’s own work is designed 
to support more accountable, inclusive and peaceful states 
and societies. Some of BBC Media Action’s experience 
is derived from attempts to support national public 
conversations in fragile states. While not trying to replicate 
the BBC, this is rooted in the public service broadcasting 
values that underpin the organisation (see box, Building 
shared identity through public service broadcasting).
 “Strategies that seek to limit people’s freedom of 
expression and access to 
information are as likely 
to foster discontent and 
violence as to prevent it.”
Building shared identity through public service broadcasting
Public service broadcasting exists to serve all citizens of a country 
in order to inform, educate and entertain. It does so by providing 
trusted, impartial sources of information and platforms for 
public discussion and engagement. The principles that underpin 
public service broadcasting include universality (in terms of 
access and appeal to all parts of society), independence from all 
vested interests including government, and the importance of its 
contribution to a sense of national identity and community. 
Supporting models built on public service broadcasting values to 
encourage a greater sense of shared identity can emerge from 
work with a single broadcaster or highly connected networks 
of private or community broadcast media. BBC Media Action’s 
work on a DFID-funded project in Angola, Sierra Leone and 
Tanzania suggests that, in certain political settings, a series of 
national public conversations can be built through partnerships 
through – and among – local community broadcasters. 
Public service broadcasting can work very effectively from the 
ground up. For example, BBC Media Action has worked with 
the BBC Swahili service in Tanzania to produce the national 
radio discussion programme Haba Na Haba (Little by Little) 
while working with six local partner radio stations to build local 
capacity and programming. The organisation’s work in Sierra 
Leone includes support for the Independent Radio Network 
(IRN) which, during the November 2012 elections, involved 
producing election-specific programming with 28 partner 
stations including a 24-hour broadcast on election day. 
In Zambia, BBC Media Action has worked with both the national 
broadcaster ZNBC and three community radio stations around 
the country – Yatsani Radio, Radio Chikuni and Radio Liseli – to 
air live and “as live” debate shows. In Nepal, the debate 
programme Sajha Sawal (Common Questions) is broadcast over 
national Tv and on more than 100 FM and community radio 
stations. Research carried out around Sajha Sawal found that 86% 
of people exposed to the programme reported that it is their 
right to say how a country is run, compared with 65% of those 
who had not been exposed to the programme. Some 69% of the 
former said they intended to vote in the next general election, 
compared to 59% of the latter. Similar programmes have been 
produced in Bangladesh, Kenya, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Palestinian 
Territories, Tunisia and Libya, among other countries. Elsewhere, 
such as in Nigeria, radio drama has been produced – with more 
than a third of listeners saying that they acted differently as a 
result of listening to the programme (such as registering to vote).
BBC Media Action continues to engage in promising training 
and capacity-building programmes focused on these values in 
countries such as Burma.
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In some countries, only the national broadcaster is able 
to reach and engage all people and all communities in a 
country. In most fragile states, the national broadcaster 
is the state broadcaster. State broadcasters are defined 
here as broadcasters that are controlled and owned 
by the state and that work in the interests defined by 
the government of the time. National public service 
broadcasters are independent 
of the state and work solely 
in the interests of, and at the 
service of, their audience. 
various attempts to transform 
state broadcasters into politically 
independent and financially 
sustainable public service 
broadcasters have had mixed 
results. Strategies have included 
regulatory reform, institutional 
reform, training and capacity 
building. Increasingly, attempts to transform national 
broadcasting involve support for programming that is 
characterised by public service broadcasting values: 
putting the audience first, being impartial, insisting on 
editorial independence, building trust and being creative. 
However, the challenges of the wholesale reform of state 
broadcasters – and the obstacles to their transition to 
public service broadcasters – are many. Some problems 
can be overcome with clear strategic focus and long-term 
engagement but others are intractable and explain 
why reform efforts present serious challenges. The 
most significant problems tend to be political rather 
than technical. Governments, especially relatively 
weak governments in fragile states – operating in 
communication environments where many other actors 
control or influence their own media – find it very difficult 
to surrender control of what they regard as their own 
state media. 
A genuinely trusted national media capable of providing 
a platform for national public debate that enables divided 
communities to strengthen their shared identity seems 
increasingly important in fragile states. It is very difficult 
to see how, for example, post-transition Afghanistan is 
to develop a shared identity without a way for its people 
to engage in dialogue with each other, understand each 
other better and resolve their differences in the public 
sphere. In 2013 no obvious trusted national space for 
that dialogue among citizens exists, and market forces 
in Afghanistan seem unlikely to foster such a space. The 
same can be said of many Arab Spring states struggling 
to reinvent their fractured countries and searching for 
mechanisms to help find shared values, aspirations and 
identities, rather than those which divide them.
A sustained and creative debate on how to transform 
state broadcasters into public service broadcasters, or 
develop alternative models of national public service 
broadcasting, is especially necessary in fragile states. 
Right The media can 
help to foster a sense 
of shared identity. 
Here some of the 
team behind the 
Libyan radio station 
Tribute FM – which 
started during the 
uprising – present a 
show from their studio 
in Fuwhaat district of 
Benghazi. IvO
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 “A genuinely trusted national media capable of 
providing a platform for 
national conversations that 
enable divided communities to 
strengthen their shared 
identity seems increasingly 
important to fragile states.”
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The challenges and opportunities of building shared identity: 
the case of Radio Television Afghanistan
The BBC Media Action policy briefing, The media 
of Afghanistan: the challenges of transition, paid 
special attention to whether and how the media 
could help build a stronger sense of shared identity 
in the country. Members of the public, politicians 
and journalists alike who were interviewed for 
the briefing, stressed that a lack of shared identity 
was a major obstacle to successful transition in 
the country. 
“Stations have not been created on the basis of 
the needs of the people; they have been set up to 
serve the interests of foreign countries or powerful 
warlords,” said one former independent MP. 
“We still don’t have a country-wide media. In 
Afghanistan today, we seem to lack confidence to 
build institutions,” commented one experienced 
journalist. “The biggest need in the media sector is 
unity, consensus and national understanding”, said 
another, “otherwise, we will never pull ourselves 
out of this difficulty.” 
Much comment focused on the need for a national 
public service broadcaster and on the weaknesses 
and strengths of the state broadcaster, Radio 
Television Afghanistan (RTA). Focus groups gauged 
the perceptions of ordinary Afghans, especially 
those outside of Kabul. “National Tv is the best” 
said a Hazara woman, “because it has broadcasts 
in all the languages like Hazara, Pashto, Tajik, even 
uzbek, Balooch and Pashayee”. “It is a symbol of 
union and coalition,” said one of her colleagues. A 
worker in Herat liked RTA programmes “because 
they are produced according to Afghan culture”. 
An illiterate woman in Kabul district said one of the 
benefits of RTA is that “All their programmes are 
suitable for elders, young people, kids and women.” 
At the same time, there is a sense that it does not 
live up to its name. “It should not act partially,” 
said one Herati middle-class woman. “As its name 
is Meli (national), it should always tell the facts 
and realities to the people.” Another commented: 
“Actually, a national Tv… should not have one-sided 
programmes; it has to convey people’s views, 
whether they are government or opposition. People 
expect more of the national channel. It has to be 
responsive to people’s needs.”
Such perceptions have led some to argue that the 
state broadcaster RTA could play a vital national 
role if it reformed and became more effective. 
The Media Law of 2009, passed by the previous 
parliament by a two-thirds majority, was an attempt 
to equip RTA for that purpose. It allows RTA to 
play a more independent national role, with a 
governance structure representing government, 
parliament and civil society organisations. But it 
has not been fully implemented. President Karzai, 
initially a strong supporter of the idea, has proved 
reluctant to give up 
direct control of the 
state media. 
Whether RTA is 
capable of fulfilling 
such a role is another 
question. It is already 
much weakened and 
would require visionary 
leadership to transcend 
a highly fractured 
Afghan society. But 
RTA has some distinct 
advantages. BBC Media 
Action’s research 
suggests that, despite 
widespread scepticism 
about its news, which 
concentrates too much 
on the comings and goings of ministers, RTA is still 
seen as a custodian of national culture and values, 
reaching out to all major ethnic groups in their own 
languages. It also has a decentralised structure, 
which provides scope for provincial radio and Tv 
stations to offer a customised service to local areas. 
Imminent structural reform of RTA seems unlikely, 
but BBC Media Action has been working with the 
organisation to enable it to produce editorially 
balanced, national public debates designed as a 
series of national conversations. Recorded in Dari 
and Pashto, Open Jirga reaches out to all Afghans. 
The programme brings together men and women 
from across Afghanistan’s diverse communities and 
provides them with a space to engage with national 
leaders on the country’s future. President Karzai 
appeared on the programme in February 2013, 
the first time in the country’s history that an Afghan 
head of state had appeared on national media to 
be publicly questioned by Afghan citizens. 
Shirazuddin Siddiqi, BBC Media Action’s country 
director and conceiver of Open Jirga, said “I didn’t 
get enthused by [the concept in Afghanistan] until 
I was convinced in 2010 that the whole decade 
of investment in blood and effort and goodwill 
[in nation building] was at stake.” He added that 
millions poured into Afghan media development 
“left the provinces behind”, and that most media 
– because they choose to operate in either Dari or 
Pashto languages – were not inclusive: “My idea was 
to create a national dialogue and adopt the Afghan 
concept of jirga, opening it to educate everyone, so 
it naturally fit into Afghan culture.”54
The apparent popularity of Open Jirga may in time 
lead to other broadcasters investing more of their 
own resources in similar public debate programmes 
capable of bringing diverse communities together.
Above Afghan 
President Hamid 
Karzai takes questions 
from the audience on 
the BBC Media Action 
debate programme 
Open Jirga (Open 
Assembly). BBC 
Media Action has 
been supporting Radio 
Television Afghanistan 
(RTA) to produce 
editorially balanced 
public debates.
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 PART 6
 Prioritising the media in fragile states
It is not clear how the role of the media, and the associated 
huge transformations in access to digital technologies, 
are positioned within current development discussions 
focused on support to fragile states. There are very few 
fragile states where responsibility for strategic planning 
and support to the media is obviously identified within 
any one agency. The analysis carried out in BBC Media 
Action’s policy briefings on the media in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, Kenya and Somalia suggested a lack of a clear focal 
point for ensuring coherent and strategic support for, or 
analysis of, the media in each country except Somalia. 
In Afghanistan, for example, intensive development 
discussion is focused on strengthening post-transition 
security, the economy, the health and education systems 
and much else besides. There is little or no obvious 
strategic consideration of, or nominated lead 
agency focused on, the future of the media – 
despite the evolution of the country’s media 
being widely considered a relative success 
story of international development support.
At the international level, and even within 
agencies that significantly support the media 
in fragile states, there are questions over 
where responsibility sits. In his National 
Endowment for Democracy report on 
support to uN radio stations, for example, 
Bill Orme argued that: “The management, 
impact, and ultimate fate of these uN stations… has 
largely escaped the notice of policy-makers… To this 
day, there is not even an official record of past and 
present uN mission radio services.”55 There is no lead 
agency in the development sector tasked with 
understanding the role of the media in fragile states, 
and offering guidance, strategic leadership and 
coordination on how development agencies could best 
respond to these issues.
Support for the media is not obviously integrated into 
mainstream development discourse on fragile states. 
In 2011, a New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States 
between donors and governments of fragile states was 
agreed at the Fourth High Level Conference on Aid 
Effectiveness, held in Busan, South Korea. The New 
Deal outlined five peace-building and state-building 
goals, the first of which is to achieve legitimate politics 
and to foster inclusive political settlements and conflict 
resolution (others focused on security, justice, economic 
foundations, and revenues and services). The fact that 
there is no reference to the role of the media and 
communication in this deal is not a concern given the 
broad principles it was focused on, but there is scant 
evidence that these and associated issues are being 
substantively reflected or highlighted in discussions on 
fragile states. 
The complex role of the media in fragile states is 
somewhat lost in the aid architecture. Political, 
messy and difficult as it is, there is no obvious source 
of impetus for the development sector to make it 
a priority. Country governments, increasingly the 
main driver of aid priorities within the international 
development system, rarely want to make media issues 
a priority. Even if governments started to support an 
independent and professional media, it is not something 
that sits comfortably within traditional conceptions of 
“country ownership”. Some recommendations on how 
to address these issues are provided in the final section 
of this briefing.
 “There are very few fragile states 
where responsibility 
for strategic planning 
and support to the 
media is obviously 
identified within any 
one agency.”
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 PART 7
Conclusions and recommendations
This briefing is mainly aimed at development actors in a position 
to support the successful achievement of sustainable political 
settlements and development outcomes in fragile states. 
Conclusions and recommendations resulting from BBC Media 
Action’s research and analysis follow.
Media matters in fragile states
Media and communication environments are changing rapidly, 
as are the ways that people access and use information and 
communication. These changes are having increasing and 
sometimes profound political and developmental effects. Some 
of these have negative impacts and others are positive. Stronger 
analysis of, research into and strategic support to media in fragile 
states are increasingly warranted.
Freedom of expression need not be 
sacrificed for state stability
A key conclusion of this report is that sacrificing media freedom 
and freedom of expression with the aim of making the state more 
stable is likely to be ineffective and counterproductive. 
Some critics of media liberalisation strategies suggest that some 
form of censorship and containment of the media may be a 
logical option in support to fragile states, at least until the state 
becomes more stable and governable. It is difficult to see from 
these case studies how such censorship would have produced 
better outcomes for the media, state, society or citizens. Greater 
control exercised over the media could in fact lead to further anger 
building within the pressure cooker of political fragmentation in 
fragile states. More effective support and engagement to media 
in fragile states would be a more effective response.
These case studies do suggest, however, that there are real 
dangers if media is routinely co-opted by factional actors, and 
that fragmentation of the media can lead to the reinforcement 
of factional identities. Media and other communication systems 
do need to be better understood and supported to help prevent 
fuelling factional tensions. 
Enabling a national public conversation
Special challenges exist in enabling the kind of media and 
communication system best able to provide a platform for a national 
public conversation to facilitate the development of shared identity. 
Market forces alone seem unlikely to bring into being media that is 
both independent of government, national in scope and scale and 
capable of engaging all sections of society, including the poorest and 
most marginalised. More creative strategies and external support 
will be required if national public service broadcasting systems are 
to be more successful in providing such platforms in the future.
Media regulation has to be part of the political settlement in any 
fragile state. The regulatory framework needs to include rules 
for proportionate political coverage of parties and mechanisms 
for including minority political and cultural interests. It must also 
include transparent guidelines for setting licences for stations 
under terms which allow all media actors – even small ones  – 
to participate. The international community is particularly well 
situated to promote regulatory reform, as the latter draws 
extensively on international norms and treaties.
Integrating support to media into the post-
Millennium Development Goal framework
Following the publication in May 2013 of the High-Level Panel of 
Eminent Persons Report on the post-2015 development agenda, 
there is a historic opportunity for the values of freedom of the 
media and access to information to play a more central role 
in the post-2015 development agenda.56 The report proposes 
integrating into the set of goals designed to replace the existing 
Millennium Development Goals, one ensuring “good governance 
and effective institutions”. It identifies five elements necessary 
for achieving this goal. One of these is to “ensure people enjoy 
freedom of speech, association, peaceful protest and access 
to independent media and information”. Such a goal should be 
welcomed.57 
Integrating media and communication issues 
into the fragile states agenda
Issues relevant to state fragility arising from transformations of 
media and communication landscapes could be more effectively 
integrated into debate and strategic action around fragile states. 
These issues could be better considered within national, bilateral 
and multilateral development strategies, and better integrated 
into established mechanisms already set up to underpin support 
to fragile states.
Nearly all bilateral, and several multilateral, actors are investing 
in tools to understand better the political complexity and drivers 
influencing political and development outcomes, especially in 
fragile states. The issues raised in this briefing – the role of the 
media, new technologies and access to information – could be 
better integrated into political economy analysis and similar 
exercises. 
Both the positive and negative aspects of the media tend to become 
more pronounced during elections. The electoral cycle approach, 
pioneered by the united Nations Development Programme 
(uNDP), the European Commission and the International Institute 
for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), is a 
major step forward in systematically planning support to elections, 
with special value in fractured fragile states. Building media and 
communication issues within this approach so proper analysis 
can take place years before an election would have real benefit 
in enabling effective long-term support strategies.
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